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Nurturing Unrest 
International Media and the Demise of Ceauşescuism 
DRAGOŞ PETRESCU 
 
 
 
 
Much has been written on the violent, sudden demise of Romanian commu-
nism on 22 December 1989. However, when analyzing the swift and devastating so-
cietal reaction against the communist regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 
1989, one is compelled to address a rather simple question: What determined the 
more pro-active stances by the population against the regime? The answer is by no 
means simple since Romania did not have a strong tradition of public protest and 
overt opposition against the communist regime. No opposition ”from below”, on 
the model of the Polish Solidarity, or ”from above”, on the model of the Czecho-Slo-
vak Prague Spring, emerged under the communist rule in Romania. The present 
study proposes a historical analysis of the way in which international media con-
tributed in keeping alive, or in developing, a spirit of opposition towards the re-
gime among Romania’s population. It was, actually, an intricate historical process 
that, by the end of the 1980s, made a large majority of Romania’s population listen 
to the information broadcast in Romanian by international radio stations and trust – 
not entirely, to be sure, but to a large extent – the information transmitted. 
In order to investigate such a process, the present study concentrates on the 
international broadcasting in the languages of East-Central Europe and addresses 
both long- and short-term processes. Furthermore, this analysis is based on the 
concepts of communication, propaganda and persuasion. Communication refers to 
the transmission of factual, straight information that observes the ethics of the 
transmission of information. Propaganda is a particular form of communication, 
which attempts to ”achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propa-
gandist”1. According to Kimball Young, propaganda can be defined as: ”The more 
or less deliberately planned and systematic use of symbols, chiefly through sugges-
tion and related psychological techniques, with a view to altering and controlling 
opinions, ideas, and values, and ultimately to changing overt actions along prede-
termined lines”2. The present study also discusses the main aspects of the battle 
that opposed pro-democracy propaganda to ”Red” propaganda during the Cold 
War psychological warfare. Persuasion differs from propaganda in the sense that it 
is ”transactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee”. 
According to Victoria O’Donnell and June Kable, persuasion is: ”A complex, con-
tinuing, interactive process in which a sender and a receiver are linked by symbols, 
                                                
1 Garth S. JOWETT, Victoria O’DONNELL, Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications, 
Newbury Park, Calif., 1992, p. 1. For more on the issue of propaganda see Bertrand TAITHE, Tim 
THORNTON (eds.), Propaganda: Political Rhetoric and Identity, 1300-2000, Sutton Publishing, 
Phoenix Mill, U.K., 1999 and Jürgen WILKE (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century: Contributions to 
its History, Hampton Press, Cresskill, N.J., 1998. 
2 Quoted in J. A. C. BROWN, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing, 
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, U.K., 1977, p. 19. 
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verbal and nonverbal, through which the persuader attempts to influence the per-
suadee to adopt a change in a given attitude or behavior because the persuadee has 
had perceptions enlarged or changed”1. 
This paper is structured on two parts. The first part discusses the Western, 
mainly American, efforts of international persuasion and anticommunist propa-
ganda during the Cold War period (1945-1990) and concentrates mainly on the ac-
tivity of Radio Free Europe (RFE)2. It also analyzes the way in which RFE covered 
the first major event that shook the communist bloc – the 1956 Hungarian Revolu-
tion – and how the broadcasting policy of RFE changed after that event. The sec-
ond part addresses a more specific issue: the role of the international media in pic-
turing, on the one hand, an idealized image of the ”capitalistic” West and ”the 
American way of life” and, on the other hand, in keeping alive the spirit of opposi-
tion in communist East-Central Europe. The argument put forward in this part is 
that, by emphasizing the great diversity of consumer goods produced by capital-
ism, this sort of propaganda constantly undermined the communist propagandis-
tic efforts. This part also discusses the specific role international media played in 
bringing down the Ceauşescu regime through the continuous flow of information 
which, after the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev (March 1985), and espe-
cially during the ”miraculous year” 1989, created a special state of mind among the 
population. This analysis also focuses on international media’s strategy of mixing 
communication with propaganda and persuasion, that is, of combining the trans-
mission of straight information with more sophisticated methods of influencing 
public opinion. This kind of information, broadcast mainly by RFE, had an appre-
ciable impact on the populations living under communist regimes, and eventually 
contributed to the appearance of the chain reaction that led to the collapse of com-
munism in East-Central Europe. Arguably, international media played an impor-
tant role in revealing and, by means of sophisticated methods of mass communica-
tion, (over)emphasizing the structural flaws of the communist system. By doing 
this, it contributed to the shaping of the political cultures of resistance in commu-
nist countries, and speeded up the process that culminated with the final demise of 
communist regimes. The following analysis demonstrates that, due to the specific-
ity of the Romanian communism, i.e., the nature of the regime and community po-
litical cultures, international media had a strong impact on the collapse of commu-
nism in Romania. 
Furthermore, one should be aware of the fact that international media had a 
more limited impact on the collapse of other communist regimes in East-Central 
Europe. In Hungary, for instance, due to the legacy of the 1956 revolution, which 
shaped both the regime and community political cultures, international media had 
a less significant influence on the final demise of the communist regime. At the 
same time, international media played, for better or worse, a major role in the 1956 
Hungarian revolution. Equally important, in the Hungarian case, as well as in the 
                                                
1 Quoted in Garth S. JOWETT, Victoria O’DONNELL, Propaganda... cit., pp. 1, 21. As Jowett 
and O’Donnell argue: ”Persuasion has the effect, when it is successful, of resulting in a reaction 
such as, ’I never saw it that way before’. What happens is that the recipient of the persuasive 
interaction relates or contrasts the message to his or her existing repertoire of information”, 
Ibidem, p. 21. 
2 For a perceptive analysis of the way in which the United States conducted their Cold War 
psychological warfare, see Michael J. SPROULE, Propaganda and Democracy: The American 
Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion, Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, 1997.  
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case of post-1968 Czechoslovakia and post-1981 Poland, international media con-
tributed heavily in the making of the myth of ”freedom fighting” nations (Hun-
garian, Czech and Slovakian, Polish), as opposed to the ”submissive” nations (Bul-
garian and Romanian). For instance, with regard to the alleged submissiveness of 
the Romanians under communist rule, Dennis Deletant aptly observed that ”virtu-
ally nothing was known in the West of the courageous struggle in the Carpathian 
Mountains of small bands of partisans [in the early 1950s]”1. Nevertheless, after the 
1989 revolutions, such myths contributed heavily to the rapid ”adoption” of the 
former nations into the family of civilized European nations and to the protracted 
inclusion of the latter. 
COLD WAR PROPAGANDA WARFARE: 
WORDS, IDEAS, AND PERCEPTIONS 
Since the present analysis is also concerned with propaganda warfare, a brief 
survey of the structure of Western broadcasting in foreign languages during the 
Cold War period would contribute to a better understanding of the argument put 
forward by this part. According to George R. Urban, who was the director of RFE 
between 1983 and 1986, there were two main streams of broadcasting in the na-
tional languages of Sovietized Europe2. A first category was represented by the 
programs of radio stations such as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice 
of America (VOA), Deutsche Welle (DW), Radio Vatican, etc. The main goal of 
these radio stations, however, was to promote the political, economic and cultural 
interests of their governments. In other words, they had only a limited interest in 
the fate of the populations under the Soviet-type regimes, since their main purpose 
was to pursue their own national interests. A second type comprised Radio Free 
Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), which were sponsored by the United States 
government (both radio stations started to operate in 1951-1952 in Munich, Ger-
many). RFE broadcast in the languages of the ”other Europe” and, more impor-
tantly, its scope was to identify with the aspirations, national sentiments, and cul-
tural traditions of the populations that fell under Soviet yoke in the aftermath of 
Word War II. Equally important, its role was to keep alive the hope of liberation 
and self-determination in those countries. As Urban aptly put it, RFE’s role was to 
speak to ”Poles as Poles, Czechs as Czechs”3. Radio Liberty had a more compli-
cated mission, since it was destined to speak to the whole population of the Soviet 
Union. One should also keep in mind that Soviet Union was, in fact, a colonial 
                                                
1 Beginning in the late 1940s, in Romania, in the Carpathian Mountains, developed an armed 
resistance against the newly installed, Soviet-backed communist regime. A majority died in the 
fights, some were caught and executed, and only a few survived. It is also true that not all those 
who fought in the mountains against the communist regime did this in the name of democracy. 
However, this chapter of Romania’s recent history seems to be totally neglected by those who 
advocate the distinction between the ”rebellious” Central Europeans (Hungarians, Czechs, and 
Poles) and the ”non-rebellious” Southeast Europeans (Bulgarians and Romanians). For Deletant’s 
assertion, see his Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1999, p. 225. 
2 George R. URBAN, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold 
War, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, pp. ix-x. 
3 Ibidem, p. 2. 
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empire, and the radio had to address not only Russians, but also Ukrainians and 
other non-Russian populations, with different agendas towards self-determination 
and national fulfillment, so that the effectiveness of RL was seriously diminished. 
There were also the critical events that shook communism in East-Central 
Europe to which RFE had to react and exploit, in order to undermine the commu-
nist regimes in the respective countries. Events of this kind were the Hungarian 
1956 revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring or the birth of Polish Solidarity in 1981 – 
the first free trade union in a communist country. In this respect, one of the most 
controversial issues related to RFE’s activity in the 1950s was its involvement in the 
1956 Hungarian revolution. Some authors have argued that RFE, through its Hun-
garian-language broadcasts, irresponsibly misled the insurgents and made them 
believe that a Western intervention, on the side of the revolution, was imminent. 
Recent analyses revealed that it was an unfortunate interplay of misleading, incit-
ing, passionate comments and analyses from the part of the staff of the Hungarian 
Section of RFE, and a great deal of wishful thinking from the part of the revolu-
tionaries, who wanted to believe that the American administration was going to in-
tervene militarily in order to support them. A brief survey of the RFE coverage of, 
and involvement in, the 1956 Hungarian revolution would help one understand 
better why the broadcasting policy of RFE changed in the aftermath of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution. Equally important, such an analysis would provide more 
elements for investigating the way in which the Romanian desk of RFE responded 
to the December 1989 events in Romania. 
The 1956 Hungarian revolution broke out on 23 October, sparked by a demon-
stration of students from different universities in Budapest. It must be mentioned 
that the events in Hungary had been stirred by the spectacular changes that had 
taken place that summer in Poland, and were extensively covered by RFE. As Ur-
ban perceptively put it: 
”Radio management would have done well to recognize without delay 
the implications of Gomułka’s rehabilitation and popular acceptance in Po-
land, and the enthusiasm with which Hungary’s mushrooming student cir-
cles, schoolchildren’s parliaments, dissident intellectual associations, and 
other ’assemblies’ were adopting and then beginning to apply the Polish ex-
ample to Hungarian conditions, the culmination of the trend being the de-
mand for Imre Nagy’s return to power”1. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand Hungary’s road to the 1956 revolution, it 
is important to stress the paramount importance of Nikita Khrushchev’s ”secret 
speech” to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). Delivered on the night of 24-25 February 1956, Khrushchev’s ”secret 
speech” opened a new chapter in the history of communist regimes2. In Poland 
                                                
1 George R. URBAN, Radio Free Europe … cit., p. 229. 
2 As Robin Alison Remington puts it, Khrushchev’s secret speech ”informed the party elite 
that the leader they had venerated was a tyrant, murderer, military incompetent with a ’mania for 
greatness’ and no respect for Lenin’s memory”. Moreover, the same author argues: ”Although the 
Soviets attacked Stalin for domestic reasons, the repercussions of that attack were international. 
In particular, East European Communists could hardly afford the luxury of de-Stalinization. Too 
much had been done in the name of Stalin. Memories were too raw. Worse, the practical result of 
rehabilitation would be to free a large, obviously hostile element into already festering 
populations”. See Robin Alison REMINGTON, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist 
Conflict Resolution, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, pp. 28-29.  
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and Hungary it decisively contributed to the ”Polish October” of 1956 and, respec-
tively, to the 1956 Revolution. It was in Hungary where Stalinists were the first to 
lose influence after the death of Stalin in March 1953. In July 1953, the Hungarian 
Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi was forced to resign from the post of Prime Minister 
(he managed, though, to remain First Secretary of the party) and Imre Nagy be-
came Prime Minister. Nagy would retain the post of Prime Minister until April 
1955 when Rákosi, skillfully maneuvering against Nagy’s reform communism and 
using top apparatchiks’ fear of change, succeeded in ousting him1. 
The 1956 Polish events, which shortly preceded the Hungarian revolution, had 
an appreciable impact on the unfolding of events in Hungary. As Paul Lendvai ar-
gued, in Hungary “demonstrations of sympathy with Poland on 23 October 1956 
turned out to be a direct prelude to revolution”2. In Poland, in the context of a sharp 
economic decline, on 28 June 1956, in the town of Poznań, the workers from the Sta-
lin Works (Zakłady Imieniem Stalina, Poznań – ZISPO), known before 1939 as the 
H. Cegielski rolling stock factory, went on strike. That specific workplace in Poznań 
had strong working-class traditions from the interwar period and was one of the 
largest factories in Poland at the time, employing some 15 000 workers, which can 
also explain why the workers there provoked the first major social outburst in post-
war Poland3. The protesters marched into town demanding a wage increase, more 
dwellings for workers, and a revision of the stiff working norms and high taxation. 
In the beginning, the crowd – witness accounts speak of a crowd between 20 000 
and 100 000 people – marched peacefully, but in Poznań’s downtown the demon-
stration took a violent form. The communist authorities intervened savagely: the 
suppression of the revolt, carried out by the army, resulted, according to official es-
timates, in 53 workers killed and 300 wounded. It should be also mentioned that in-
dependent Polish sources put the numbers at 74 people killed and 400 wounded4. 
A cleavage, however, existed at the level of the Polish communist ruling elite. 
In the conditions of the bloody suppression of the Poznań workers’ revolt, the 
mentioned cleavage deepened and led to a change at the highest level of the Polish 
United Workers Party (PUWP). On 21 October 1956, Władisław Gomułka – who 
had been ousted from the PUWP’s Central Committee in November 1949 and had 
spent subsequently three years in prison (1951-1954) – was (re)elected as party 
leader5. As some authors argue, Gomułka’s position as a national leader and his 
apparent resistance to the Soviets created the prerequisites of building the legiti-
macy of Polish communists6. It is also true that workers, peasants, intellectuals and 
                                                
1 For more on this, see François FEJTÖ, A History of the People’s Democracies: Eastern Europe 
Since Stalin, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971, pp. 23-26. 
2 See Paul LENDVAI, Hungary: The Art of Survival, I. B. Tauris, London, 1988, p. 47. 
3 Michael D. KENNEDY, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of 
Soviet-Type Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 26. See also R. F. LESLIE 
(ed.), The History of Poland since 1863, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 349-350. 
4 Michael D. KENNEDY, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland …cit., p. 26. 
5 Between 1949 and 1951, PUWP underwent a series of major purges which amounted to a 
loss of around 350 000 party members. In November 1949, Władisław Gomułka and his close 
associates Zenon Kliszko and Marian Spychalski were accused of ”rightist and nationalist 
deviation”, ousted from the Central Committee of the PUWP and banned from holding party 
office. For more on this see Jan B. DE WEYDENTHAL, The Communists of Poland: An Historical 
Outline, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Calif., 1986, pp. 63-65.  
6 As Andrzej Korbonski argues, ”in October 1956, Gomułka, perceived as a victim of 
Stalinism and as a standard bearer of Polish independence as well as enjoying the support of the 
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the party members desired ”security and stability”, and it was believed that 
Gomułka would be the leader to achieve it1. 
As already mentioned, the revolution in Hungary was initiated by the student 
manifestation of 23 October 1956. The demonstrators met at the statue of General 
Józef Bem, a Polish general who was involved in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution 
and led the revolutionary forces in the 1849 battles against the Habsburgs2. How-
ever, numerous inhabitants of Budapest joined the demonstration, so that the 
crowd that gathered at the statue numbered tens of thousands. It was that demon-
stration that sparked the revolution. Departing from the statue of General Bem, a 
large part of the crowd headed for the Parliament. Following the Polish model – 
the coming back to power of Gomułka – many shouted slogans such as: ”Imre 
Nagy into the government!”. Nagy, who was outside Budapest and had returned 
to the city in the morning of 23 October, was asked in the evening to speak to the 
crowd of around 200 000 people who waited for him in the front of the building. 
Eventually, Nagy spoke indeed to the demonstrators, but he ”addressed them 
briefly in cautious terms” and tried to appease the crowd. Consequently, many left 
frustrated3. Numerous protesters headed for the City Park and removed the statue 
of Stalin erected nearby – only a pair of boots remained on the pedestal. At the 
same time, radical protesters stormed the building of the public radio, and shots 
were fired by both those who guarded the building and from the part of the insur-
gents. Some authors consider that the storming of the public radio marked the be-
ginning of the armed revolt4. From that moment on, the events unfolded rapidly. 
Imre Nagy, who was named Prime Minister, made efforts to find a political so-
lution to the crisis, while the revolution spread throughout the country. On 27 
October, a new government composed of less compromised communists was an-
nounced, and on 1 November, Nagy informed Yurii V. Andropov, the Soviet am-
bassador, about Hungary’s decision the step back from the Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation. In the evening, Nagy announced on the radio that Hungary proclaimed its 
neutrality. Between 1 and 4 November, the pace of changes indicated a clear trend 
towards the establishment of a democratic political order. On 4 November 1956, 
the Soviet troops attacked Budapest and put an end to the Nagy’s government ac-
tivity. With Soviets’ support János Kádár came to power and, on 7 November, his 
regime was officially instated. 
During the 1950s, no similar events occurred in Romania. As shown below, 
crucial events, on which RFE had an appreciable influence, occurred much later, in 
December 1989. However, since few authors have addressed the Romanian reac-
tion to the 1956 Hungarian revolution, some details are necessary. The Romanian 
                                                
[Catholic] Church, was in an excellent position to make communism legitimate”. See Andrzej 
KORBONSKI, ”Dissent in Poland, 1956-76”, in Jane Leftwich CURRY (ed.), Dissent in Eastern 
Europe, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983, p. 39. 
1 Michael D. KENNEDY, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland … cit., p. 27. 
2 François FEJTÖ, A History of the People’s Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin, Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 77. On the role played by General Bem in the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1848 see László KONTLER, Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary, 
Atlantisz Publishing House, Budapest, 1999, pp. 254-259. 
3 See Stephen D. Kertesz, ”Hungary,” in Stephen D. KERTESZ (ed.), East Central Europe and 
the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 
1962, pp. 125-126.  
4 See György LITVÁN (ed.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression 
1953-1963, Longman, London, 1996, p. 58. 
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communist elite condemned the Hungarian revolution and succeeded in convinc-
ing the Soviets of their profound loyalty – after all, the 1956 events in Poland and 
Hungary favored the strategy of the Romanian Stalinist leader, Gheorghe Gheor-
ghiu-Dej, to preserve his personal power and avoid de-Stalinization. The popula-
tion, however, sympathized with the insurgents and numerous individuals ex-
pressed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution in those days1. In the city of 
Timişoara, the manifestations of sympathy towards the Hungarian revolution were 
the most virulent. As one of the participants confessed, students listened avidly to 
foreign radio stations, including Radio Budapest, searching for news about the 
course of events in Hungary. Unrest developed slowly from 23 to 30 October, 
when a mass meeting was called. The regime, however, reacted swiftly and ruth-
lessly to hamper the spreading of the protest: between 30 and 31 October 1956, the 
army and the secret police occupied the student campus and around 3 000 students 
were arrested. Of those arrested 31 were put on trial and sentenced to terms vary-
ing from 2 to 8 years in prison2. Although the protest was savagely suppressed, the 
population of Timişoara kept alive the spirit of anticommunist resistance: it was in 
Timişoara that the 1989 Romanian revolution began. 
To sum up, as far as RFE’s broadcasting policy is concerned, the 1956 events in 
Hungary provoked significant changes. As shown above, during the days of the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution many of the insurgents believed that the West would 
support them. Furthermore, many took literally the American propaganda. True, 
Western propaganda, and especially some irresponsible comments and appeals 
coming from RFE led many Hungarians to believe that their sacrifice was not in 
vain. As far as the broadcasting policy of RFE is concerned, some argued that the 
staff of the Hungarian Service was too right wing, which could explain the nature 
of comments and appeals broadcast in those days. Others stated that something 
was wrong at the management level of RFE. Whatever the explanation, a profound 
misunderstanding occurred. A young Hungarian revolutionary spoke in bitter 
words of the tragedy of a majority of the revolutionaries, who thought that their 
revolt would be supported by the West: ”Words like ’freedom’, ’struggle for na-
tional honor’, ’roll-back’, and ’liberation’ have meanings…. If America wants to 
flood Eastern and Central Europe with these words, it must acknowledge ultimate 
responsibility for them. Otherwise you are inciting nations to commit suicide”3. 
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that RFE did not provoke the 1956 revo-
lution. Indeed, as Urban’s thorough analysis shows, the Hungarian-language pro-
grams of RFE caused profound misinterpretations during the 23 October–4 Novem-
ber 1956 events4. What is of prime importance for this analysis, however, is that 
from 1956 on, the policy of the Radio changed. As a consequence, during the next 
crises of world communism – Prague 1968, Gdansk 1980, East-Central Europe 
1989 – no 1956-like appeals to frontal challenge were ever made. At the same time, 
as shown below, the strategy of RFE relied on a sophisticated combination of 
                                                
1 See especially the reports by the Securitate informers regarding the popular reactions to the 
1956 Hungarian revolution in Corneliu Mihai LUNGU, Mihai RETEGAN (eds.), 1956 – Explozia: 
Percepţii române, iugoslave şi sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia şi Ungaria, Editura Univers 
Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 1996. 
2 With regard to the 1956 events in Timişoara a precious witness account is Aurel BAGHIU, 
Printre gratii, Editura Zamolxis, Cluj-Napoca, 1995, esp. pp. 7-24. 
3 Quoted in George R. URBAN, Radio Free Europe … cit., p. 220.  
4 Ibidem, pp. 239-242. 
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communication and propaganda meant to nurture domestic opposition to the com-
munist regimes in East-Central Europe. The way in which such a strategy worked 
in the case of Romania is addressed below. 
CEAUŞESCU’S ROMANIA:  
FROM DISENCHANTMENT TO REVOLUTION 
As already mentioned, the case of Romania is quite unique, because the inter-
national media, and especially the Romanian desk of RFE, played a major role in 
the collapse of the communist regime. One should explain, however, why the in-
ternational media was so influential, and why the overwhelming majority of Ro-
mania’s population listened to the programs of the foreign radio stations? The an-
swer is by no means simple, since it requires a detailed analysis of the period of de-
cline that started around 1977. Between 1981 and 1989, Romania experienced a pe-
riod of deep economic crisis, cultural autarchy, ethno-national propaganda and 
widespread malaise. In this context, there were two major trends that converged 
and made an overwhelming majority of the population pay a special attention to 
international media. 
First and foremost, it was the emergence of an idealized image of the West 
that made the population, primarily the younger generations, to look after Western 
cultural products. Because of the economic crisis and regime’s policy of cultural 
autarky, indigenous cultural products were prevalent, from music to movies. 
Therefore, there is no wonder that audiences deserted and looked elsewhere for 
something new. However, the quest for Western cultural products led also to a 
habit of listening to programs in Romanian language broadcast by foreign radios. 
Among these, RFE programs featured prominently and contributed in many ways 
in nurturing the opposition to the regime among younger audiences. 
Second, it was the character of the public life in the 1980s that determined a to-
tal mistrust, of a majority of country’s population, towards the official press, radio, 
and television. People were simply exasperated by the official propaganda, which 
spoke unrelentingly of regime’s unparalleled achievements under the wise guid-
ance of Nicolae Ceauşescu, the ”Genius of the Carpathians”. The real situation was 
totally different, and people knew it. Therefore, they wanted to find more about re-
cent international and domestic events and turned to foreign radio stations, of 
which, again, RFE was usually the first choice. 
The Idealized Image of the West 
An idealized, even mythical image of the prosperous West emerged among 
the populations living under ”really existing socialism”. Such an image, continu-
ously nurtured by the international media, contributed heavily to the breakdown 
of communism. A famous scene from the movie Megáll az idő (Time stands still) by 
the Hungarian film director Péter Gothár, wonderfully epitomizes this aspect. In 
post-1956 communist Hungary, at a party, someone brings a bottle of Coca-Cola – 
one of the most desired beverages among the young generation under commu-
nism, and one of the strongest symbols of the West and the ”American way of 
Nurturing Unrest 417 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. V • no. 2 • 2005 
life”. After taking a glass of Coke, one of the participants effectively gets drunk, 
and has to be carried home by his brother and some friends1. This scene is, per-
haps, the best illustration of how powerful the myth of the capitalistic West was 
among the young generations living in the Sovietized countries of East-Central 
Europe. Nevertheless, one should be reminded that, in the late 1980s, Hungary was 
better off than many of the other communist countries in East-Central Europe. To 
be sure, an idealized image of the West existed also in Hungary, in the late 1980s, 
but Kádár’s ”soft dictatorship” and ”gulyás communism” elevated the living stan-
dard to a certain extent and reduced accordingly the level of frustration among the 
population. An album published by András Gerő and Iván Pető, which recon-
structs the atmosphere in Hungary during the Kádár era by combining photo-
graphs and press reports, conveys a convincing overall image of that period2. 
The case of Romania is perhaps more emblematic in analyzing the way in 
which international media contributed in spreading a mythical image of the afflu-
ent, capitalistic West. As shown above, until the middle 1970s the regime had some-
thing to offer to Romania’s population at large. Industrialization, urbanization, 
spread of education, acceptable sanitation, rather fair chances of upward mobility, 
all these led to a tacit deal between regime and society. Beginning in the early 1980s, 
however, the economic policy of the Ceauşescu regime plunged the country into a 
deep economic crisis, characterized by food rationing measures for bread, sugar, 
cooking oil and other basic foodstuffs. Simultaneously, in order to reduce country’s 
external debt, the regime drastically reduced imports, which deepened further the 
food crisis. In the conditions of economic failure described above, the West, with its 
affluence and freedom, became a sort of Paradise on Earth in the minds of the ordi-
nary Romanians. To be sure, such a representation of the West nurtured the politi-
cal cultures of the resistance and, in the long term, contributed to the sudden col-
lapse of the regime in December 1989. As a Western scholar aptly puts it: 
”It is perhaps a sad but significant fact that the biggest factor in the fall of 
East European communism was not the desperate striving for political free-
dom so much as a desire for a Western standard of living seen on Western 
television which East Europeans could pick up, a standard of living that com-
munist governments could not deliver”3. 
It was this silent, long-term process of imagining the affluent West that under-
mined regime’s efforts to control the society as a whole. (It is also true that such a 
widespread, distorted image of the capitalistic West aggravated the syndrome of 
”civilizational incompetence”. People were not used to work hard, face competi-
tion and take risks, which led to difficult problems of adaptation to a functioning 
market economy in post-communist Romania.) Western consumer goods became, 
for many Romanians, a sort of cult objects. Those who received parcels from the 
West used to invite their relatives or friends to the ”ceremony” of parcel opening 
to admire together the colorful labels and nice packages, and have a taste of good 
life. Brand names such as Fa and Lux (toilet soap), Kent (cigarettes), Rifle (Ital-
ian-made blue jeans), were synonymous with the affluent West. Western products 
were so desired that average Romanians developed strange habits. When they 
                                                
1 Péter GOTHÁR, Megáll az idő (Time stands still), 105 min., 1981. 
2 See András GERŐ, Iván PETŐ, Unfinished Socialism: Pictures from the Kádár Era, Central 
European University Press, Budapest, 1999. 
3 Ian ADAMS, Political Ideology Today, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001, p. 284. 
418 DRAGOŞ PETRESCU 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. V • no. 2 • 2005 
could procure from the black market a scented soap, say, a Fa soap (the German 
brand was particularly desired in communist Romania), they did not use it: they 
placed it inside the wardrobe to scent the clothes and the underwear. Furthermore, 
chronic shortages of consumer goods led to a politicization of consumption and to 
an increased attraction to Western goods. As Katherine Verdery puts it, ”you could 
spend an entire month’s salary on a pair of blue jeans, for instance, but it was 
worth it: wearing them signified that you could get something the system said you 
didn’t need and shouldn’t have”1. 
The idealized image of the capitalistic West and the ”American way of life” 
also spread through informal networks of Western videocassettes. In many cases, 
communist officials or secret police officers brought such tapes to Romania and fu-
elled the networks2. In late Ceauşescuism a video player was also seen as a symbol 
of material affluence that one should rather conceal. For instance, a joke that circu-
lated in Bucharest at the time reads as follows: 
”A kid was playing in the front of the block together with other kids whose 
parents and grandparents were sitting nearby. He saw his mom coming from 
work and shouted out: ’Mom, which is the most secret thing, that papa listens 
to the Radio Free Europe, or that we’ve bought ourselves a video player?’”3. 
Nevertheless, as a Romanian sociologist suggested, the informal videocassette 
networks did not constitute dissident networks. At the same time, they contributed 
decisively to the spread of a mythical image of the affluent West. Those videotapes 
spoke – as an advertisement for the Kent cigarettes reads – about a ”magic mo-
ment”4. A ”magic moment”, it must be added, that could be experienced only in 
the capitalistic West, and certainly not under ”really existing socialism”. 
For those who could not afford a video recorder or did not have a friend or 
relative to own one, radio was a cheap and convenient means of evading from the 
misery of late Ceauşescuism. The official radio and TV broadcast boring, if not to-
tally uninteresting programs, dedicated mainly to the ”most beloved Man of the 
Fatherland”, the ”Genius of the Carpathians”, Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu. One 
should be reminded that Romania was a special case since, during the 1980s, the 
national TV station broadcast only two hours in the evening, and almost the whole 
program was dedicated to the Ceauşescu ruling couple. For instance, on 27 Janu-
                                                
1 Katherine VERDERY, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1996, p. 29. Actually, in the 1980s, a pair of blue jeans was sold on the black 
market for 1 400-1 500 lei. To have an idea of how much that sum meant it would be useful to 
mention that in 1987, this author, as a young engineer in his first year of activity, had a monthly 
salary of 2 160 lei.  
2 It was said that, in the late 1980s, communist Romania had the largest number of video-
cassette recorders (VCRs) per capita of all the communist countries of East-Central Europe. 
Although such an assertion is difficult to prove, if one looks into the advertising pages of the 
daily newspaper România Liberă of the late 1980s, one can find numerous announcements for 
VCRs offered for sale by individuals. One should also note that the overwhelming majority of the 
population could not afford to buy a VCR. At the time, on the black market the cheapest VCR was 
sold at an average price of 45 000 lei, which was equivalent to 20 medium monthly salaries. 
Considering the prohibitive prices of video players, not to speak of video recorders, collective 
viewing was predominant. 
3 Reproduced in Martor: The Review of Anthropology of the Museum of the Romanian Peasant, 
Bucureşti, no. 7, 2002, p. 72. Hereafter quoted as Martor. 
4 See Bogdan VASI, ”Fenomenul ’video’ şi mirajul American”, in Iniţiativa Culturală Stu-
denţească (ICS), Târgu Mureş, nr. 3-4, aprilie-mai 1996, p. 14. 
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ary 1987, one day after Nicolae Ceauşescu’s anniversary, which was celebrated on 
26 January, the national TV station broadcast from 8 P.M. to 10 P.M. as follows: 
”8:00 P.M.:  News; 
8:20 P.M.:  ’We praise the country’s leader!’ (Poetry); 
8:40 P.M.:  ’Brilliant theoretician and founder of communism’ (Documen-
tary dedicated to the theoretical work of comrade Nicolae 
Ceauşescu); 
9:00 P.M.:  ’We salute the supreme commander!’ (Performance realized by 
the army’s artistic brigades); 
9:50 P.M.:  News; 
10:00 P.M.:  Closing of the program”1.  
It is therefore understandable why Romanians attempted to forget the hard-
ships of the everyday life by shifting to the programs of foreign radio or TV sta-
tions2. Moreover, one should be reminded that, as compared with the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic, former Czechoslovakia, Poland or Hungary, Romania 
does not border Western countries. Until 1989, Romania’s neighbors were, from 
West to the East, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Conse-
quently, many Romanians built special TV antennas to receive programs from 
neighboring countries. To be sure, the areas located in western Romania, such as 
the Timiş and Arad counties, had the advantage of being able to receive the more 
liberal programs of the Hungarian and Yugoslav TV stations. This aspect should 
not be neglected when analyzing the relationship between the exposure to the in-
ternational media and the anti-regime attitudes in that part of the country. In Bu-
charest, the only alternative to the Romanian official TV program was the Bul-
garian television, a situation which at the time was subject of numerous jokes that 
also emphasized regime’s failure to fully control its subjects by restricting their ac-
cess to information3. 
As far as ”light” musical novelties were concerned, the foreign radio stations, 
such as RFE, Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle etc. were the most listened to. 
The younger generations, especially, listened avidly to the late night rock music 
programs of RFE – intelligently placed after the political programs, and the Voice 
of America. In the conditions of the structural crisis of the late 1980s, however, the 
way from rock to opposition towards the regime proved to be unexpectedly short. 
Younger generations, most prominently the 1968-1969 generation, went through a 
different process of political socialization – in which RFE’s programs played an ap-
preciable role – and were more inclined to protest against the regime than the gen-
                                                
1 Reproduced in Sorin MITU et al., Istoria românilor, Editura Sigma, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 131. 
2 To be sure, the regime was worried by the population’s interest in the programs of foreign 
radio and TV stations. Although it was not officially confirmed, in the late 1980s circulated 
persistent rumors about Ceauşescu’s alleged request to the managers of the Romanian consumer 
electronics factories (radio and TV sets) to design and produce equipment that could only receive 
the programs of the national Radio-Television.  
3 For instance: ”The schoolmistress: Children, please tell me how do you apply the Party di-
rectives concerning electricity saving. Popescu! Popescu: My mother keeps the food on the balcony 
so that she does not have to use the refrigerator. The schoolmistress: Good! Ionescu! Ionescu: When I 
come back from school I do not go out to play. Instead, I start immediately doing my homework, 
so that in the evening we do not have to turn on the lights. The schoolmistress: Good! Bulă! Bulă: In 
the evening we watch the Bulgarian television so that we consume their electricity!”. See Dana 
Maria NICULESCU-GRASSO, Bancurile politice în ţările socialismului real, Editura Fundaţiei 
Culturale Române, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 200. 
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eration of their parents. Such a trend did not pass unobserved by the RCP and its 
secret police. As documents from the Securitate files recently released for research 
show, during the 1980s a major problem of the Securitate was the ”extraordinary 
audience” that RFE programs had among adolescents in Romania. The Party was 
aware that of the young public that listened to musical programs of RFE would be 
transformed into the more politicized public that would contest soon the RCP poli-
cies. Measures were taken to identify and punish the adolescents who were writing 
to RFE to ask for musical dedications. For instance, in a report dated 16 February 
1985, the Securitate agents informed that three adolescents from Bucharest schools 
who had sent messages to the RFE musical program were identified. Their names 
were: Liviu Barbu (Secondary School no. 108), pseudonym Lie; Liviu Constan-
tinescu (Industrial High School no. 27), pseudonym Lopez; and Daniela Toniu 
(Secondary School no. 160), pseudonym Kim. The Securitate had, nevertheless, a 
crucial problem: How could one identify and punish the hundreds of youngsters 
who were writing to the RFE under pseudonyms such as Lord John, Marshal 
Hendrix, Richard Right, Zoly the 13th, Heavy Metal 21, the Crab with Eyeglasses or 
the Yellow Vampire1? 
The Triangle of Romanian Dissidence (1977-1989) 
During the 1980s, for a large majority of the Romanians, the main source of in-
formation with regard to international relations and politics, East-West relations 
and Cold War related issues, was RFE. Since, for obvious reasons, there are no sur-
veys on the size of RFE audience in Romania during the communist period the re-
searcher is compelled to rely on scarce and unsystematic information. Neverthe-
less, it may be argued that it was before the effects of the structural crisis of the 
1980s were felt that an appreciable part of the population started to listen on a 
regular basis to RFE’s programs. In fact, the year 1977 was a turning point also in 
terms of Romania’s population interest in RFE’s programs. Episodes of protest 
against the regime on which the regime kept a total silence, such as the Goma dis-
sident movement and the Jiu Valley miners’ strike, made many Romanians turn to 
RFE programs for details and comments. It was also an unexpected event, namely, 
the terrible earthquake of 4 March 1977 that made RFE programs very popular in 
Romania. In the aftermath of the earthquake, many of those living abroad wanted 
news about close relatives and friends and RFE, through its non-stop programs, 
tried to cope with such a demand. RFE also provided information on the interna-
tional efforts to help Romania and, more importantly, spoke of things that the re-
gime wanted to avoid, such as the way in which the rescue operations were organ-
ized and carried out. This author, for instance, a schoolboy at that time, became ac-
quainted with RFE during the nights that followed the earthquake of 4 March 1977. 
During the 1980s, however, RFE voiced a sharp criticism of the Ceauşescu re-
gime, from both foreign and domestic, i.e., from within the country, individuals or 
groups. Again, although there is little systematic information and clear data on this 
topic, it is generally accepted that RFE was one of the most, perhaps the most, 
listened to foreign radio station in Romania during the 1980s. The voices of Noel 
                                                
1 For more on this, see Mihai PELIN, Operaţiunile ”Meliţa” şi ”Eterul”: Istoria Europei Libere 
prin documente de Securitate, Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 278-280. 
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Bernard, Emil Georgescu, Vlad Georgescu, Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca and 
Emil Hurezeanu, to name only a few, entered every evening the homes of a major-
ity of Romania’s population. It is also important to mention that, after 1989, many 
of the former speakers, analysts and collaborators of RFE published their diaries, 
memoirs, or the analyses written at the time. Such works are also important be-
cause they provide consistent autobiographical information and reveal that, in the 
overwhelming majority of the cases, those who worked for, or collaborated with, 
the Romanian desk of RFE opposed communism in the name of democracy and 
not because of right-wing convictions1. 
The way in which the Romanian desk of RFE contributed to the final demise 
of communism in Romania deserves a thorough investigation. As already noted, in 
Romania did not develop a dissident or a Solidarity-like movement. However, iso-
late protests did occur, and courageous people did speak openly against the re-
gime. For such an isolated protest to become vocal enough as to embarrass the re-
gime, two things were obligatory. First, that the protester avoid imprisonment; and 
second, that his or her message spread among their fellow citizens and a way to 
achieve these goals was to inform the Romanian Service of RFE about their initia-
tives. This way, international human rights organizations could be announced in 
due time, and could provide support and some protection to dissidents by launch-
ing international media campaigns. At the same time, by making their voices heard 
through RFE, dissidents’ ideas could spread among their country fellows. There-
fore, it is this author’s opinion that a sort of triangle of dissidence developed in 
post-1977 Romania. This can be defined as a relational nexus composed of the dis-
sidents, the Romanian section of RFE and the silent mass of Romanians, unable or 
unwilling to articulate a coherent protest. Through RFE, dissidents’ ideas influ-
enced a major part of Romania’s population and fuelled the growing discontent 
with the regime. 
Some examples would be useful in order to illustrate the way in which the tri-
angular relational nexus of Romanian dissent actually functioned. For instance, 
writer Paul Goma, the leader of the first Romanian movement for human rights, 
was imprisoned on 1 April 1977 after sending a letter of solidarity, in January 1977, 
to Pavel Kohout, one of the leaders of Czechoslovak Charter 77. The news concern-
ing Goma’s imprisonment reached the Romanian Section of RFE, which launched 
an international campaign for his liberation. Similarly, another prominent Roma-
nian dissident, Dan Petrescu, made his ideas known with the help of international 
media. Petrescu’s open criticism towards the regime – he stated clearly that it was 
the communist system to be blamed for Romania’s disastrous situation and not 
solely the person of Nicolae Ceauşescu – spread among Romania’s population es-
pecially through RFE2. 
It is also true that the information regarding the opponents of the regime was 
not always accurate. In Romania, few foreign press correspondents were dis-
patched and, when they came, their travels throughout the country were closely 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Monica LOVINESCU, La apa Vavilonului/2: 1960–1980, Editura Humanitas, 
Bucureşti,  2001; Anneli Ute GABANYI, The Ceauşescu Cult, The Romanian Cultural Foundation 
Publishing House, Bucureşti, 2000; Mircea CARP, ”Vocea Americii” în România, 1969–1978, Editura 
Polirom, Iaşi, 1997; Nicolae STROESCU-STÂNIŞOARĂ, În zodia exilului: Fragmente de jurnal, 
Editura ”Jurnalul Literar”, Bucureşti, 1994 and Noel BERNARD, Aici e Europa Liberă, Editura 
Tinerama, Bucureşti, 1991. 
2 Dan PETRESCU, Liviu CANGEOPOL, Ce-ar mai fi de spus: Convorbiri libere într-o ţară 
ocupată, rev. ed., Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 231-243. 
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supervised and they were denied any access to the opponents of the regime. There 
were different ways in which such protests arrived to RFE in Munich. In general, 
information arrived in the West through foreign diplomats, employees of the inter-
national companies, recent emigrants, and foreign lecturers associated with Roma-
nian universities. In some cases, foreign reporters, who took great risks, could meet 
opponents of the regime. For instance, two reporters from Gamma News Agency 
realized, in April 1988, an interview with Dan Petrescu. Shortly afterwards, the 
two were arrested, their equipment confiscated and expelled from Romania. Fortu-
nately, a copy of the filmed interview was left behind in safe hands, in the city of 
Iaşi, where the interview was taken, and smuggled to the West one year later. Fi-
nally, the interview was broadcast by the French TV channel France 3 on 26 Janu-
ary 1989, and re-transmitted by RFE on 8 February 19891. 
The acerbic comments and analyses broadcast by RFE contributed decisively 
to a changing of the mindset of the population, who started to cast serious doubts 
towards the regime’s social, economic and cultural policies, and to develop a spirit 
of resistance. Announced by an unforgettable tune by the Romanian composer 
George Enescu – the main musical theme of his Second Romanian Rhapsody in D 
minor, Op.11 – Actualitatea românească was perhaps the most popular of RFE’s pro-
grams because of its open criticism and pungent satire of the Ceauşescu regime. It 
is also important to emphasize the courage, determination and commitment for de-
mocratic values of those who worked for the Romanian desk of RFE. In numerous 
cases, the Romanian desk of RFE made possible the transmission of dissident mes-
sages that were not usually allowed by the broadcasting policy of the RFE, as es-
tablished in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Some of the commen-
tators or collaborators of RFE’s Romanian desk went so far as to risk dismissal be-
cause of their overt attacks on the communist regime in Bucharest and their sup-
port for the isolated voices of the Romanian dissidence2. 
This, however, incurred great risks from the part of the staff of RFE’s Romanian 
Service. At this point it is important to emphasize that under Gheorghiu-Dej, the Se-
curitate adopted a rather passive attitude towards the activity of the RFE. Moreover, 
such an attitude was maintained in the first years of the Ceauşescu regime, i.e., until 
the early 1970s. Things, however, changed fundamentally during 1970s, when the 
Party ordered the Securitate to take pro-active and even offensive steps to combat 
RFE’s activity3. One should also note that between 1981 and 1988 the Romanian 
desk lost three of its directors in a row: Noel Bernard (1981), Mihai Cismărescu – 
pen name Radu Gorun (1983), and Vlad Georgescu (1988). As Urban put it, RFE 
”had suffered no comparable loss in any of its other national services”4. These pre-
mature deaths were highly suspicious, and many observers spoke of the active in-
volvement of Ceauşescu’s secret police, the Securitate, although not much could be 
proved. According to General Ion Mihai Pacepa, perhaps the most prominent high 
rank officer that defected to the West during the communist years – he left Romania 
on 23 July 1978 and arrived in the US, via Frankfurt/Main, on 28 July 1978 – the 
Securitate had to do with those suspicious deaths. Pacepa speaks in his memoirs of a 
                                                
1 See the complete text of the interview in ibidem, pp. 268-279. 
2 See document no. 399, ”Notă informativă”, dated August 1986, in Mihai PELIN et al. (eds.), 
Cartea Albǎ a Securitǎţi: Istorii literare şi artistice, 1969-1989, Editura Presa Românească, Bucureşti, 
1996, p. 352. 
3 See Mihai PELIN, foreword to IDEM, Operaţiunile ”Meliţa” şi ”Eterul”…cit., pp. 8-9. 
4 George R. URBAN, Radio Free Europe … cit., pp. 127-128. 
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radioactive device, whose code name was ”Radu”, utilized by the Securitate to irra-
diate regime’s opponents. According to Pacepa, Ceauşescu ordered a portable ver-
sion of ”Radu” to be manufactured and placed in Noel Bernard’s office at RFE1. 
Nevertheless, Ceauşescu’s determination to silence his most vehement critics 
in RFE’s Romanian Service was clear and dates back to 1977. A first attack against 
an editor of RFE’s Romanian desk was carried out on 18 November 1977, in Paris. 
On that occasion, two mercenaries allegedly hired by the Securitate on Ceauşescu’s 
orders savagely beat Monica Lovinescu, a reputed literary critic and RFE editor. 
(Beginning in 1967, Monica Lovinescu realized for RFE an important program, 
”Theses and anti-theses in Paris” which was widely listened to in Romania.) The 
attack on Monica Lovinescu was also linked to her active involvement in launching 
(spring 1977) the international campaign in favor of writer Paul Goma. Fortu-
nately, Monica Lovinescu has left a personal account of the attack. Unfortunately, 
her account cannot be corroborated with the information contained in the Securitate 
files. However, the information gathered until now indicates towards an involve-
ment of the Securitate2. A similar attack was orchestrated in July 1981, in Munich, 
against Emil Georgescu, one of the most caustic commentators of RFE’s Romanian 
Service. In the case of Emil Georgescu, however, the Securitate files suggest that the 
attack was actually a Mafia-type operation incurred by some murky financial ar-
rangements Georgescu was involved into. At the same time, there is still scarce in-
formation to be corroborated with that provided by the Securitate files. Therefore, 
at the present stage of research, in the Georgescu case is still unclear if it was in-
deed an operation of the Securitate or a revenge of Georgescu’s alleged dubious 
business partners3. Both Monica Lovinescu and Emil Georgescu were seriously in-
jured, but survived the attacks. 
In their search for dissident discourses in communist Romania, RFE’s com-
mentators also influenced, consciously or not, the nature of the post-1989 tran-
sition to democracy. After 1985, the name of Ion Iliescu was often associated with 
the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. Persistent rumors circulated in Bucharest about 
Moscow’s intention to replace Nicolae Ceauşescu by Ion Iliescu. In its determi-
nation to nurture opposition and dissent from within and outside the Party, 
RFE was equally interested in the person of Ion Iliescu. For instance, on 19 De-
cember 1987, in his program dedicated to reviewing Brucan’s recently published 
book Socialism at Crossroads, Vlad Georgescu made reference to Ion Iliescu’s views, 
in many respects similar to those of Gorbachev4. Such references contributed in 
making the name of Iliescu known to wider audiences, both in Romania and 
abroad, and contributed significantly to the widespread acceptance of Iliescu as 
the leader of the National Salvation Front in the afternoon of 22 December 1989. 
                                                
1 Ion Mihai PACEPA, Red Horizons, Heinemann, London, 1988, p. 416. Pacepa also states that 
Elena Ceauşescu was particularly angered by Emil Georgescu’s caustic comments and wanted 
to silence him.  
2 For a personal account of the November 1977 attack, see Monica LOVINESCU, La apa 
Vavilonului … cit., pp. 247-252. On the scarcity of the Securitate files regarding the attack on 
Monica Lovinescu released for research until now, see Mihai PELIN, Operaţiunile “Meliţa” şi 
“Eterul”… cit., pp. 119-122. 
3 On the attack on Emil Georgescu, see George R. URBAN, Radio Free Europe … cit., p. 128. 
For the information on Emil Georgescu contained by the Securitate files, see Mihai PELIN, 
Operaţiunile “Meliţa” şi “Eterul”… cit., pp. 161-163 and 239-242. 
4 See Vlad GEORGESCU, Editorial no. 42, ”Reading Brucan,” Air date: 19 December 1987, 
Romanian Fond, OSA/RFE Archives, pp. 3-4. 
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Ion Iliescu himself has acknowledged the role RFE played in emphasizing his 
critical stance towards the huge waterworks projects envisaged by Ceauşescu 
during the 1980s1. 
The role international media – RFE in particular – played during the ”miracu-
lous year” 1989 deserves a thorough investigation. A first thing to say is that to-
wards the end of the communist rule in Romania, listening to RFE became custom-
ary. As writer Stelian Tanase noted in his diary on Thursday, 7 September 1989: 
”When I arrive home, along the doors on the hallway, the buzzing sound of the 
short waves: people have switched definitively on Radio Free Europe”2. It may be 
argued that the case of Romania is quite unique because the Romanian desk of RFE 
played a role of prime importance in the collapse of the communist regime. As this 
author has demonstrated elsewhere, a combination of structural, nation-specific 
and conjunctural factors made unavoidable a bloody revolution in Romania, 
unique in the context of the 1989 revolutions in East-Central Europe3. The ”move-
ment of rage” that overthrew the Ceauşescu regime in December 1989 was fuelled 
by the news concerning the unfolding of events in the other communist countries. 
A participant to the 1989 revolution in Timişoara remembers: ”For some years I 
was following daily the programs of RFE and Voice of America waiting for ’some-
thing to happen’. It was clear for me that the end of Ceauşescu was close”4. An-
other revolutionary from Timişoara, Ioan Savu, confesses that he was walking by 
the Maria Square in Timişoara beginning with 14 December waiting for the mo-
ment, i.e., the revolutionary moment: ”I felt that we, Romanians, were also close of 
the crucial moment of our existence. Fortunately, in Timişoara, we are kept in-
formed with sufficient news from the free world by the Yugoslav and Hungarian 
TV stations. So far, the downfall of the socialist system had started in all the coun-
tries around us”5. 
International media had a paramount influence during the period 16-22 De-
cember 1989, i.e., the period between the revolt in Timişoara and the uprising in 
Bucharest. The news about the Timişoara uprising reached the Western capitals 
from the night of 17-18 December on. Immediately, international media picked up 
the news and broadcast it widely. The Romanian desk of RFE, especially, re-trans-
mitted the news, both to the international and Romanian audiences. From that mo-
ment on, the overwhelming majority of the Romanian population knew that the in-
habitants of Timişoara initiated mass protests against the regime. In this respect, 
eyewitness accounts abound. Daniel Vighi recalls that when the revolution 
sparked in Timişoara, many of those who took part in the events were concerned 
with spreading the news to the outside world and their first thought was to an-
nounce RFE6. Another participant to the Timişoara revolt, Dan Ştefan Opriş, af-
firms that, in those crucial days of 16-22 December 1989, RFE was the only link 
                                                
1 Ion ILIESCU, Revoluţie şi reformă, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 41. For Iliescu’s 
own account of his critical stances towards the Ceauşescu regime see pp. 41-43. 
2 Stelian TĂNASE, Ora oficialǎ de iarnǎ, Institutul European, Iaşi, 1995, p. 143. 
3 See Dragoş PETRESCU, ”The 1989 Revolutions in Hungary and Romania: Comparative 
Perspectives”, in Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 3, no.1, 2003, pp. 22-55. 
4 See the testimony of Alexandru Corneliu Cuţara in Marius MIOC, Revoluţia din Timişoara şi 
falsificatorii istoriei, Editura Sedona, Timişoara, 1999, p. 65. 
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between the Timişoara protesters and the rest of the country1. The overwhelming 
majority of the Romanians, including the present author, who witnessed the 1989 
Romanian Revolution in the city of Târgovişte, hundreds of kilometers away from 
Timişoara, heard about the revolt in Timişoara from the programs of RFE. Simi-
larly, Liviu Antonesei, a critical intellectual from Iaşi, speaking of those days, con-
fessed: ”I shall never forget the almost non-stop programs of Radio Free Europe”2. 
Again, in those crucial days, it was the continuous flux of information broadcast by 
RFE that mobilized the population and kept alive the hope in the demise of Roma-
nian communism3. 
When Ceauşescu ordered, somehow unexpectedly, for a mass meeting to be 
organized in Bucharest on 21 December, those forced to take part in the event 
knew perfectly well that by that time the city of Timişoara was effectively in the 
hands of the revolutionaries. During the Bucharest meeting the crowd started to 
shout due to a provocation from within and, a few minutes later, a panic-stricken 
crowd was trying to leave the place. Intended to support Ceauşescu’s rule, the 
meeting turned into an anti-Ceauşescu demonstration. Gathered in the University 
Square in Bucharest, some demonstrators erected a barricade and continued their 
protest during the night of 21-22 December. In spite of the bloody repression, the 
next day, 22 December 1989, large crowds blocked the streets of Bucharest and oc-
cupied Party’s Central Committee building, while other groups occupied the main 
building of the national television. On 22 December 1989 at 1208 hours, when 
Ceauşescu’s helicopter left the upper platform of the Central Committee’s build-
ing, the communist rule in Romania was over. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the particular conditions of 1989 Romania, the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu 
wanted to obscure, for the overwhelming majority of the population, the meaning 
of what was happening in the rest of Sovietized Europe. Furthermore, the regime 
wanted people not to realize that the Soviet Union itself had changed dramatically, 
beginning in 1985, under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership. As shown above, inter-
national media played an important role in identifying and, by means of sophisti-
cated methods of mass communication, overemphasizing the structural flaws of 
the communist system. By doing this, it contributed to the shaping of the political 
cultures of resistance in communist countries, and speeded up the process that cul-
minated with the final demise of communist regimes. This paper has demonstrated 
that, due to the specificity of the Romanian communism, i.e., the nature of the re-
gime and community political cultures, international media had a strong impact 
on the collapse of communism in Romania and its role must not be neglected. Inter-
national media, RFE most prominently, nurtured unrest in Romania by supporting 
                                                
1 Ibidem, p. 105. 
2 See Liviu Antonesei, Jurnal din anii ciumei, 1987-1989: Încercări de sociologie spontană, Editura 
Polirom, Iaşi, 1995, p. 122. 
3 For a collection of telegrams, articles, and news of the international news agencies, 
newspapers and radio stations during the period 17-20 December 1989, see Miodrag MILIN 
(ed.), Timişoara în arhivele ”Europei Libere” – 17-20 Decembrie 1989, Fundaţia Academia Civică, 
Bucureşti, 1999. 
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the few radical dissidents in that country during the 1980s and by providing a con-
tinuous flow of information concerning the unfolding of events in East-Central 
Europe during the revolutionary year 1989. 
At the same time, one should be aware of the fact that international media had 
a more limited impact on the collapse of other communist regimes in East-Central 
Europe. In Hungary, for instance, the 1956 revolution and its aftermath shaped 
both the regime and community political cultures, in the sense that the idea of 
avoiding at all costs another direct confrontation between the communist authori-
ties and the population was profoundly internalized at both regime and commu-
nity levels. Thus, international media had a limited impact on the final demise of 
communism in Hungary. 
 
